The cost attribute is of particular importance in discrete choice experiments since estimates of the cost coefficients are often used to calculate the marginal willingness to pay for the other attributes included. Only few studies have investigated how the inclusion of a cost attribute in discrete choice experiments affects preferences, and this study is the first to explore the effect of a cost attribute on both forced and unforced choices. In the empirical contribution, patients' preferences for the organisation of general practice in Denmark are elicited. The cost attribute is operationalised as user fees for the consultation. Other attributes included are: waiting time in the telephone, opening hours, waiting time to the appointment, distance to the general practice, waiting time in the waiting room, consultation time, and whether the general practitioner or assisting personnel performs routine tasks. A representative sample of 1435 respondents from the Danish population with respect to age, gender, and geography answered the discrete choice experiment in a web-based questionnaire with a random split including/excluding the cost attribute. The two groups were asked to make both forced and unforced choices in each choice set. Our results show that in the unforced choice utility and scale parameters were not affected and the rank order remained the same when a cost attribute was included. In the forced choice the test of equal utility parameters was rejected, and rank order, marginal rates of substitution, and variance was shown to differ between the two groups. We observed that the inclusion of a cost attribute tended to change underlying choice behaviour. Evidence of potential dominant preferences was found in all splits. Overall, our results provide important knowledge on the effect of including a cost attribute in forced as well as unforced choices.
Introduction
Over time, stated preference methods have become well-established tools to elicit respondents' preferences for goods without a market price and for goods in markets with market failure.
Especially the discrete choice experiment (DCE) has experienced great progress in the last decade because of its strong theoretical foundation and its ability to measure preferences for various aspects of a good. However, there are still many unsolved issues with respect to the design of the DCE. In different fields of research where the DCE is applied there have been investigations on how different survey designs affect outcomes. These studies have among other things been concerned with 1) the selection and number of attributes (e.g. Caussade et al. (2005) , DeShazo and Fermo (2002) , Hensher (2006) ), 2) the number of attribute levels and level ranges (e.g. Carlsson et al. (2007) , Caussade, Ortuzar, Rizzi, and Hensher (2005) , Mørkbak et al. (2010) , Skjoldborg and GyrdHansen (2003) ), 3) the number of alternatives (e.g. (Caussade, Ortuzar, Rizzi, and Hensher (2005) , DeShazo and Fermo (2002) , Rolfe and Bennett (2009) ), 4) the number of choice sets (e.g. Bech et al. (2011), Caussade, Ortuzar, Rizzi, and , Hensher et al. (2001) , and 5) how, whether, and when to use forced or unforced choices (e.g. Banzhaf and Johnson (2001) , Boxall et al. (2009 ), Brazell et al. (2006 , Dhar (1997) , Dhar and Simonson (2003) , Kontoleon and Yabe (2003) ). The majority of these studies find that the design of the DCE matter. In many cases changing designs influence the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) and/or error variance.
One attribute which has received particular attention in the design of DCEs is the cost attribute. The cost attribute is of particular importance in DCEs since the cost coefficients -when interpreted as an estimate for the marginal utility of income -can be used to calculate the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for the other attributes included in the DCE. This is of great importance when using DCEs for policy purposes on arguments of allocative efficiency. Studies have been made investigating how the cost attribute affects preferences in a number of ways. Johnson et al. (2010) investigated the assumption of constant marginal utility of income in five DCEs and found that marginal utility often violates the theoretical expectations, probably due to respondents' use of cognitive heuristics. Hanley et al. (2005) , Mørkbak, Christensen, and Gyrd-Hansen (2010) , Ratcliffe and Longworth (2002) , Ryan and Wordsworth (2000) , and Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen (2003) tested how different level ranges affected preferences. Four of the five studies suggested that monetary values from DCEs are sensitive to the range of monetary attributes included in the choices, while the fifth study (Hanley, Adamowicz, & Wright 2005) found no significant impact on estimates of preferences or MWTP. The use of different payment vehicles has also been tested and shown to have an impact on preferences (Boonen et al. 2009; Ratcliffe 2001; Skjoldborg & GyrdHansen 2003) , just as the ordering of the attributes has been shown to influence the estimates, leading to a recommendation of placing the cost attribute at the bottom of the choice sets to follow a precautionary principle (Kjaer et al. 2006 ). Carlsson, Frykblom, and Lagerkvist (2007) examined how different cost levels within the same range affected preferences, i.e. they compared a DCE with a cost attribute with varying levels to a DCE with a cost attribute with a constant positive level, and found that the different inclusions of the cost attribute not only affected preferences but also affected the ranking of the preferences. Bryan et al. (1998) and Essers et al. (2010) examined whether the inclusion of a cost attribute in the DCE affected preferences in a forced and unforced choice, respectively. Bryan, Buxton, Sheldon, and Grant (1998) examined preferences for magnetic resonance imaging for the investigation of knee injuries in a forced choice DCE, where respondents indifferent to the two choice alternatives were allowed to tick both alternatives (these indifferent responses were later omitted from the analyses). It was found that including a cost attribute in a choice task generated more missing data (not counting indifferent responses) and that the cost attribute itself was insignificant indicating that respondents in this setting were insensitive to price.
Further, the MRS between the other attributes did not differ between the two splits. Essers, van Helvoort-Postulart, Prins, Neumann, and Dirksen (2010) examined preferences for surgical treatment of primary basal cell carcinoma in an unforced DCE, and found that the cost attribute was significant but that the inclusion of the cost attribute did not affect preferences. None of the studies examined the effect on error variance. To the best of the authors' knowledge no other studies than the two mentioned above have examined the effect of a cost attribute on preferences by comparing DCEs with and without the inclusion of the cost attribute. In order to gain knowledge on how preferences are affected when a cost attribute is included, further research is needed.
This study contributes to the empirical literature on methodological issues related to the design of the DCE but with a novel focus. The paper examines the effect of including a cost attribute in a DCE aimed at examining preferences for organisational issues in the primary health care sector where choices are performed both as forced and unforced, i.e. DCEs with and without the status quo option. The study is the first to investigate whether the inclusion of a cost attribute affects preferences differently dependent on whether the choices are forced or unforced. This question is pertinent since both scenarios may be relevant to real-life choices and therefore to DCE designs, although the unforced choice should always be applied when opting out or choosing status quo is an option and the objective is to derive welfare measures (Lancsar and Louviere 2008; Ryan and Skåtun 2004; Viney et al. 2002) . Accordingly, the objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive investigation of the effect of the inclusion of a cost attribute on preferences in forced as well as unforced choices. The effect is measured by testing for parameter equality, differences in MRS between the other attributes, the rank order of the attributes, and testing for differences in error variance.
Section 2 describes the theoretical ideals underpinning DCEs versus the empirical evidence, while section 3 describes study design and data collection. Section 4 briefly explains the econometric specifications. In section 5 our hypotheses are presented, followed by results in section 6 and discussion in section 7.
Theoretical Ideals versus Empirical Evidence
The DCE relies on random utility theory and Lancaster's economic theory of consumption, and is consistent with neoclassic economic theory (Lancaster 1966; Manski 1977; McFadden 1974) . The individuals are assumed to act rationally and choose the alternative which gives the highest utility, and the respondents' choices are assumed to be determined by the trade-offs made between the attributes included in the choice set. Formally, the true but unobservable utility for alternative j in the choice sets (j=1,...,J) of individual i can be written as
where V ij represents the observable systematic component of utility which is the explainable proportion of the variance in utility of alternative j. The observable systematic component is a function of the attribute levels, ij X , and a vector of their coefficients, β . The observable systematic component is assumed to be a linear additive utility function. The error term, ε ij , is the nonexplainable proportion, representing the unobservable and random treated component. The error term captures heterogeneity in preferences, omitted explanatory variables, and other factors influencing decision making, e.g. bounded rationality or random error (Train 2003) .
That respondents are willing to make trade-offs between the attributes in the DCE is an important assumption as is the axioms from the neoclassical economic theory, i.e. individuals have complete, stable and consistent preferences and the indifference curve is continuous. Following these assumptions, the relative importance of the attributes measured by the MRS should not differ when an extra (cost) attribute is included in the DCE, and the rank order of the attributes should remain the same. Therefore our a priori theoretically based expectation is that the inclusion of a cost attribute will not affect the relative importance of the other attributes (hypothesis 1 in section 5). This is confirmed in empirical studies by Bryan, Buxton, Sheldon, and Grant (1998) In section 6 we explore whether it is possible to detect a change of the decision rule and/or an increase in cognitive complexity on the basis of the respondents' stated decision rules and perceived difficulties of answering the choice sets when a cost attribute is included. Further, we look at socalled dominant preference structures (Scott, 2002; Bech, Kjaer & Lauridsen, 2010) to identify respondents who consistently choose the cheapest alternative, the status quo or one of the hypothetical alternatives A or B. Clearly, such findings should be interpreted with caution since dominance is more likely to be found when respondents are presented with relatively few choice sets which is the case in this study (Lancsar and Louviere 2006) .
Design and Data
The experiment is conducted in the context of a survey on patients' preferences for general practice in Denmark where preferences for different organisational characteristics is examined. Apart from the cost attribute, which is operationalised as a user fee for the consultation, the other attributes included are: waiting time in the telephone, opening hours, waiting time to the appointment, distance to the general practice, waiting time in the waiting room, consultation time, and whether the general practitioner (GP) or assisting personnel performs routine tasks. In Table I an overview of attributes, attribute levels, and the expected effects of the attributes on preferences for choice of general practitioner is given. All attributes are familiar to the respondents. At the time of writing, there are no fees on standard services in general practice, but there is an ongoing debate on the issue. Denmark currently has user fees in other areas of the primary care sector such as dentists, chiropractors, and physiotherapists, and so the Danish public are used to paying out-of-pocket in similar circumstances. Therefore it was ex ante deemed feasible to apply the discrete choice experiment with the inclusion of a cost attribute in the context of GP services.
[
TABLE I]
Two identical (except for the inclusion of the cost attribute) Bayesian efficient main effects designs were created by means of the software Ngene provided by ChoiceMetrics. 200 Halton draws were used to approximate the probability density function and a column based swapping algorithm was used to find the most efficient design of those available. The attributes waiting time in the telephone, opening hours, waiting time to the appointment, distance to the general practice, waiting time in the waiting room, and user fee were assumed to be uniformly distributed according to the hypotheses in Table I (For attributes assuming Figure 1 shows an example of a choice set with the inclusion of the cost attribute. After the DCE respondents were asked to answer questions of how difficult they perceived the answering of the choice sets and about their decision rule, i.e. whether they focused on one or more attributes in their answers or just chose randomly. Respondents where afterwards presented with another DCE not reported in this study, questions about quality of life using the EQ-5D approach together with follow up questions about the respondents health and personal characteristics. Information on respondents' current GPs was elicited for all attributes included in the DCE. Unfortunately, the quality of the responses to this question was low. Due to many "Don't know" responses and response categories, which do not resemble the levels in the DCE (e.g. "I don't phone my GP"), it was decided to exclude the detailed information on status quo from the analysis. This is not expected to influence results since respondents are randomly allocated to the two splits with and without the cost attribute, which means that status quo GP characteristics should be identical across splits. That randomisation is successful across splits is confirmed using chi-squared tests for independence.
A pilot study with 28 respondents was conducted which lead to minor changes. Among these the most important was a reduction in the number of choice sets from eight to four (since many respondents stated that eight choice sets were too many, that they got confused, lost perspective, and could not distinguish the choice sets from each other). The questionnaire was sent out in May 2010 in a web based survey with a random split including/excluding the cost attribute. A representative sample with respect to age, gender, and geography of 1435 respondents from the Danish population above the age of 18 was collected. The target sample size was 1400 respondents who were recruited from an internet panel where members received an email with a link to the questionnaire. The link was deactivated when the quota was met. The respondents' characteristics are reported in Table AI 
Modelling Approach
Assuming that the error terms in equation (1) are independent and identically distributed (iid) extreme value random variables, a conditional logit (CL) model, which is a computationally convenient model because of its closed form, can be specified.
(2)
where µ is the scale parameter which is inversely related to the error variance. The scale parameter entails that attribute weights in DCEs are not directly comparable. It is possible to measure the relative impact of the attributes by calculating the MRS given that a linear additive function is appropriate. In the CL model, the error variances are assumed to be constant across individuals. To take account of heterogeneity in the scale parameter, a heteroscedastic conditional logit (HCL) model can be used, where the variance of unobserved factors are allowed to vary over individuals.
In the HCL model, the source of variance can be tested, i.e. it is possible to test whether the inclusion of a cost attribute affects error variances (see e.g. DeShazo and Fermo (2002) , Hensher et al. (1998) , Hole (2006) and Train (2003) ). Models are estimated in Stata 10 using the clogit and 
Hypothesis and Analyses
Following the objective of the study, three hypotheses are tested. Hypotheses 1 and 2 will be meticulously treated with the forced choice as base case while results from the unforced choice will be presented more briefly under hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 1: MRS and rank order of attributes are unaffected by the inclusion of a cost attribute.
This is tested in three ways. Firstly, the test of equal parameters (Swait and Louviere 1993 ) is used to investigate parameter equality between the two groups of respondents who received a DCE with and a DCE without a cost attribute, respectively. Secondly, the rank orders of the attributes for the two groups are compared. Thirdly, comparisons of the MRS matrices from the two groups are made. Standard errors are estimated by the delta method (Hole 2007 ).
Hypothesis 2: Error variance increases when a cost attribute is included.
This hypothesis is tested using a HCL model that investigates whether the variance across the two groups differ. A HCL model is estimated for which the scale parameters for the attributes in the DCE with and without a cost attribute are allowed to vary. and the heteroscedastic random parameters logit model where scale is allowed to vary for the utility parameters, see Greene (2007) . The specification of the heteroscedastic error component model thus entails that the likelihood ratio test of equal parameters (see section 5) is much more likely to be rejected. The random parameter logit model was found appropriate but due to a limited amount of respondents who chose between the two hypothetical alternatives in the unforced choice DCE, it was only possible to run random parameter logit analyses for the forced choice DCE. Since results from the random parameter logit and the conditional logit model in forced choice DCE come to the same conclusions, it was decided to be consistent and report results from the conditional logit model for both forced and unforced choices. However, results for the forced choice random parameter logit model are available upon request. This is investigated by testing for parameter equality, and exploring the rank order and MRS together with error variance for the unforced choice using the same approaches as described under hypotheses 1 and 2. Afterwards conclusions are made regarding whether there are differences in the effect of a cost attribute's inclusion in forced and unforced choices.
Following the testing of these hypotheses section 6.4 looks more detailed into which behavioural changes that can be observed across the study arms. Focus is on changes in cognitive burden (indicated by how difficult respondents perceived the choice tasks), decision rules (as indicated by respondents) as well as patterns in dominant preferences.
Results

Hypothesis 1
Four CL models are presented in Table II . The full model includes all observations from the forced choice DCE, while the next two models provide separate estimates for the groups receiving DCEs with and without a cost attribute. The fourth model is a HCL model, where scale is allowed to differ across the two DCEs with and without a cost attribute. The goodness of fit statistics show that all four models have extremely good model fits with all pseudo R 2 being above 0.2 (Louviere et al. 2000) . In the full models all model coefficients except for routine tasks were statistically significant with the expected signs. The likelihood ratio (LR) test of equal parameters across the groups receiving DCEs with and without user fees rejects that parameters are equal in the case of forced choice on a 5 % significance level.
[TABLE II]
In Table III No other statistical differences are found although several MRS values appear to differ in magnitude across the DCEs which include and exclude the cost attribute. Lack of statistical significance is due to the large standard errors on the attributes (especially the insignificant ones).
[ 
Hypothesis 2
The estimates for the HCL model are reported in Table II . The model reveals that the respondent group presented with a DCE with a cost attribute had a statistically significant lower scale, i.e.
higher variance on a 5 % significance level compared to the group who did not receive a DCE with user fees (assuming equal utility parameters). Thus, hypotheses 2: Error variance increases when a cost attribute is included cannot be rejected on a 5 % significance level for the forced choice DCE.
Hypothesis 3
Results for the CL and HCL models for unforced choice DCE are shown in Table V . The test for equal parameters shows that both utility and scale parameters are equal across the two groups with and without a cost attribute on a 5 % significance level.
[TABLE V]
The rank orders of the attributes are seen to be similar across groups (Table VI) and MRS cannot be shown to differ on any attributes (Table IV) .
[TABLE VI]
In summary, MRS and rank order are unaffected by the inclusion of a cost attribute, and so is error variance in the unforced DCE. The inclusion of a cost attribute is seen to matter in the forced choice DCE while the opposite is true in the unforced DCE. On the basis of these results we reject hypothesis 3: The effect on preferences is the same across forced and unforced choices when a cost attribute is included as there appears to be a difference in the effect of including a cost attribute in the different settings.
Additional behavioural results
After answering the four choice sets respondents were asked how difficult they perceived the choice tasks to be overall and what their decision rule was, i.e. whether they focused on one or more attributes or just chose randomly between the alternatives. The respondents' answers to these questions are reported in Table VII where it is seen that the perceived difficulty does not differ statistically between respondents receiving DCEs with and without user fees. With respect to the respondents stated decision rule it is seen that in the DCE with user fees, statistically significantly more respondents state that they focus on one attribute and statistically more respondents make random choices. This suggests that adding a cost attribute does not increase perceived difficulty, but that this unaltered perception may be a result of respondents relieving themselves of a cognitive burden by either using a simplified decision rule or making random choices. Note that it is not possible to distinguish between forced and unforced choices in Table VII.   [TABLE VII] In Table VIII the presence of potential dominant preferences are explored. The pattern of dominance shows that in the forced choice there is a large difference in the proneness to consistently choosing the same alternative in the two DCEs with and without the cost attribute.
When user fee is not included in the DCE, significantly more respondents (22 %) consistently choose either option A or option B. When the cost attribute is included 37 % of the respondents consistently choose the cheapest alternative. In the unforced choice between 80 and 67 % of the respondents consistently choose the status quo depending on whether the cost attribute is present or not. That so many respondents consistently choose their current GP is consistent with the large proportion of respondents (89 %) stating that they are satisfied with their current GP. It can also be shown that significantly more of the respondents who actually make hypothetical choices state that they are dissatisfied with their current GP.
When looking at the difference in patterns of dominant preferences, we can conclude that 1) consistently choosing status quo is highly prevalent in the unforced choice, and 2) consistently choosing the cheapest option is prevalent when facing a forced choice and a cost attribute, and 3) consistently choosing either A or B is more prevalent when the other options (i.e. choosing current or cheapest GP) are not available.
[TABLE VIII]
Discussion
The present study investigated the effect of introducing a cost attribute in a dual response DCE. The effect was examined by testing for parameter equality, and comparing rank orders, MRS, and variance across the DCEs with and without the inclusion of a cost attribute for both the forced and the unforced choice. Further it was tested whether the perceived difficulty and decision rule changed when a cost attribute was included, and the presence of potential dominant preferences was explored.
For the unforced choice, utility and scale parameters did not differ when a cost attribute was included, and the rank order remained the same. The result suggests that those respondents not choosing their current GP do not alter their rule of decision with the introduction of user fees since MRS, rank order, and variance remain unaffected. This result is in line with the findings of Essers, van Helvoort-Postulart, Prins, Neumann, and Dirksen (2010) . It should however be noted that the propensity to opt-out is higher (although not statistically significant at a 5 % significance level) when the cost attribute is present. This may indicate that the option of opting out replaces any other lexicographic preference structure or heuristic that could have surfaced when introducing the costattribute. That we cannot verify any impact on preferences across attributes may partly be due to the large proportion of respondents choosing the status quo, which reduces the variation in choices and the probability of obtaining statistically significant results. Future research might benefit from collecting larger samples when a large proportion of respondents choosing the status quo option is expected.
In contrast, for the forced choice, our results show that utility parameters are not equal, and that rank order, MRS, and variance differ across the DCEs with and without a cost attribute. This is in contrast to the findings of Bryan, Buxton, Sheldon, and Grant (1998) . Our results, based on respondents' self-reporting of decision rules, suggest that this observation may to some degree be explained by a change in respondents' decision rule. For some respondents, the cost attribute represents a dominant attribute and less focus is placed on other attributes. For other respondents, the inclusion of a cost attribute (or just any additional attribute) induces them to make random choices. Both explanations appear prudent since there was a significantly lower scale in the DCE with a cost attribute and 37 % of respondents consistently chose the cheaper option.
That MRS and rank order differ in the forced choice with and without the inclusion of a cost attribute is problematic in the sense that the interpretation of the MRS is dependent on respondents making trade-offs in their choices. If respondents exclusively focus on the cost attribute or choose completely at random, the assumptions behind the DCE methodology are violated and it does not make sense to calculate MRS. Recent studies have indeed shown that attribute non-attendance is evident and if the phenomenon is taken into account, estimates of MWTP differ significantly from the MWTP obtained when all attributes are assumed to influence respondents choices (Carlsson et al. 2010; Hensher et al. 2005; Hensher and Greene 2009 ). In addition, evidence suggests that there are discrepancies between respondents self-reported decision rules and decision rules inferred by using econometric techniques (Carlsson, Kataria, & Lampi 2010; Ryan et al. 2009 ). When a Bayesian efficient experimental design is used, correlation across the attributes is permitted since the aim is to obtain as robust parameter estimates as possible, trying to minimise the variance on parameter estimates. This is not a problem as long as respondents make trade-offs since preferences converge to the true population preferences independent on the design matrix (McFadden 1974).
However, if respondents deviate from using compensatory decision rules, practice might deviate from theory. If respondents' exhibit dominance for the cost attribute, correlation in the design matrix may influence parameter estimates, although this aspect of experimental designs has not yet been looked at. This means that we cannot be sure that the difference in rank order and MRS is due to differences in preferences or due to correlation in the survey design if non-compensatory decision making is used. Future research should aim at exploring this further.
In trying to understand the underlying changes that occur when presenting DCEs with and without the cost attribute in the context of both forced on unforced choice, we tested for the presence of various potential dominant preferences. Respondents only received four choice sets, so the presence of dominance is based on a small fraction of the full fractional factorial design implying that the presence of dominance may be overestimated (Scott 2002) , and Lancsar and Louviere (2006) actually discourage testing for dominance when a fractional factorial design is used since conclusive statements cannot be made. With this in mind, we did observe some evidence of dominant preferences (Table VIII) as a significant proportion of respondents consistently chose the cheapest option, status quo or alternative A or B. When respondents consistently chose either alternative A or B, there is evidence of heuristics being applied, whereas consistently choosing the cheaper alternative or the status quo may be a reflection of true (lexicographic) preferences.
It is likely that the strong preference for the cheapest alternative to some degree is an expression of objections to the introduction of user fees for a health care service which has previously been free of charge. This objection is expressed either by way of choosing the cheapest of the alternatives (if forced to choose) or by opting out (in unforced choices). It should be noted that the strong reactions against the cost attribute observed in this study may be very context specific and the noncompensatory decision making entails that it can be problematic to introduce a cost attribute in DCEs in contexts where strong reactions against price is expected. If the high proportion of respondents who chose the status quo option reflects that respondents' choosing a hypothetical alternative are those who do not mind paying for primary care (because the status quo alternative is the only alternative always free of charge), results may not be generalisable to situations where the status quo has a positive cost. However, additional analyses including a dummy variable for a positive cost attribute did not show any statistically significant effect of this regressor on choice indicating that this concern may not be warranted.
Why such a large proportion of respondents choose status quo in the unforced choice cannot be verified. We could be dealing with true preferences for the current GP. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that there is a general satisfaction with current GPs amongst those who exhibit this type of dominant preference. The large proportion may also be explained by the endowment effect on experience, i.e. that respondents chose the alternatives of which they have experience. Recent DCE studies have indeed found evidence of significant endowment effects in health care (Neuman et al. 2010; Ryan and Ubach 2003) . Consistent choice of current GP may also be explained by some degree of status quo bias, where respondents are choosing status quo consistently in order to reduce cognitive burden. This is in accordance with Boxall, Adamowicz, and Moon (2009), and Dhar (1996) who observed that more respondents chose the status quo/opt out option when choices became more complex. That a higher proportion of respondents (although not statistically significant) consistently choose status quo when the cost attribute is introduced supports this finding.
As discussed above we cannot verify whether the presence of the aforementioned dominant preference structures is a result of true (lexicographic) preferences or heuristics. What we can conclude is that dominant preferences for alternative A or B is a clear documentation of heuristics being applied. The observation that some respondents, when they do not have the option of opting out or choosing the cheaper alternative, tend to consistently go for choice A or choice B suggests that a significant proportion (over 20 %) of the respondents tend to use heuristics. Such respondents may indeed be consistently opting for lower user fees or status quo purely as a means of lessening the cognitive burden of choosing.
We have observed that the inclusion of a cost attribute in DCEs tends to change underlying choice behaviour and consequently the elicited preference structure. The observed change in preferences due to the inclusion of the cost attribute may be caused by lexicographic preference structures affecting scale and in some instances affecting the statistical significance of other attributes. We also demonstrate some evidence of a change in the ranking of attributes. Finally, the cost attribute may induce respondents to use heuristics. Inclusion of a cost attribute in DCEs allows us to estimate MWTP in order to inform on welfare implications of programmes. Analysts should however be wary of the external validity of these estimates, especially if the programmes do not actually involve out of pocket payments at the point of purchase. Future research should explore the impact of the cost attribute on preference structures in different health programme contexts, in order to verify the extent of the problem. χ ): 0.08 (3.84) * Explanatory power at a 0.10 significance level, ** Explanatory power at a 0.05 significance level, *** Explanatory power at a 0.01 significance level. a The number of observations for the unforced choice is larger than the number of observations for the forced choice since in the forced choice only two alternatives are present (1435 respondents x 4 choice sets x 2 alternatives = 11480), while respondents are presented with three alternatives in the unforced scenario (1435 respondents x 4 choice sets x 3 alternatives = 17220). 
